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Supplemental Unemployment
Benefits and Public Policy
in Ohio*
Francis Masson and Joseph Krislov
SINCE JUNE, 1955, a number of labor contracts providing for the so-
called guaranteed annual wage have been negotiated and signed. These
contracts provide only for the payment of supplemental unemployment
benefits (SUB) to certain qualified unemployed workers. Two propos-
als for revising the Ohio Unemployment Compensation (UC) law to
specifically permit the payment of SUB were defeated in 1955.' On
June 14, the Ohio Senate rejected an amendment which would have al-
FRANCIS MASSON (B.A., 1950, Washington
State College; M.A., 1951, Ph.D., 1954, Ohio
State University) was formerly with the Ohio
Legislative Service Commission, and is now
serving with the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America.
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lowed claimants to re-
ceive SUB in addition to
UC. At the November
election, the voters de-
feated an omnibus initi-
ated bill which included a
similar provision. On the
other hand, legal authori-
ties in several states have
held that SUB may be paid
under their respective
laws.2 Coming before any
SUB payments, these ad-
ministrative rulings and the expression of Ohio sentiment may not be the
final embodiment of public policy in each state. This article examines
some of the legal and economic considerations which should influence
public policy in Ohio on this issue.
* The authors are especially indebted to Mr. William Papier, Director of Research,
Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation; and Miss Truly Kincey, Department
of Economics, Ohio State University, for their many suggestions and criticisms of
previous drafts of this article.
1 The Ohio UC Law - OHIO Ray. CODE Chapter 4141 - does not contain any lan-
guage specifically permitting or prohibiting SUB payments.
2Favorable rulings were made by the Attorneys-General of Michigan, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, West Virginia, California, Il-
linois, Minnesota, Kansas and Washington. In Delaware, Florida, Arkansas, Mis-
souri, District of Columbia, Wisconsin and Kentucky the opinion was rendered by
the employment security agency. These opinions are easily found in CCH UNEMP.
INS. REP. under the respective states.
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The SUB Plans in Brief
Although the terms of the contracts vary, they follow a pattern' es-
tablished at Ford and General Motors. 3 From 3 to 5 cents are paid into
trust funds for each hour worked by employees. When the trust funds
reach ceiling amounts, the employers' contributions will be suspended.'
Generally, employees would have to meet the requirements and be draw-
ing UC in their respective states prior to establishing a claim against the
trust fund.5 The supplemental payment from the trust fund could raise
a laid-off worker's total unemployment benefits to a maximum of 65 per-
cent of regular weekly take-home pay after all tax deductions. The Ford
and General Motors plans permit a daimant to draw up to 65 percent for
four weeks, and up to 60 percent for an additional 22 weeks, or until
he again finds work or is otherwise disqualified from receiving UC bene-
fits. The can companies permit claimants to draw up to 65 percent of
their straight time wage after federal taxes in the form of company sup-
plemental unemployment benefits, UC, and income from jobs outside
the company. After the claimant has exhausted his UC, the can com-
panies will then pay a maximum primary benefit of $46.80 (plus $2 for
each of not more than four dependents) to a maximum period of 52
weeks.
The Ford and General Motors contracts provide that no benefits will
be paid for the first year (until June 1, 1956) and until supplementation
is permitted in states in which two-thirds of the bargaining unit are em-
ployed by the firm granting the benefits.6 After June 1, 1956, benefits
8 For a general discussion of this subject see Solomon, The Guaranteed Annual Wage
and Other Types of Job Security Plans- An Explanation and Analysis, 7 WEST.
REs. L. Riv. 117 (1956).
'There is no maximum funding provision in the can company contracts. For addi-
tional information on the details of the Ford, Allis Chalmers, American Can and
Pittsburgh Plate Glass plans, see E. J. Eberling, Supplemental Unemployment Pay-
ments: A New Development in Collective Bargaining, EMPLOYMENT SEcURrTy RE-
VIEW 25 (Jan. 1956).
5 Benefits may be drawn from the funds established by Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. and
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., for injury or sickness as well as for layoff. In a sim-
ilar contract negotiated by the independent Road Machinery Workers Alliance at the
Euclid Division of General Motors, a 5-cent hourly contribution is credited to indi-
vidual accounts. This is to be paid to the worker either upon receipt of state UC
benefits, in the form of a supplement, or upon termination for normal or disability
retirement, death, or "any other occurrence" which breaks seniority. Another savings-
type SUB fund is established under a contract negotiated by the Mechanics Educa-
tional Society and Eaton Manufacturing Co.'s Heater Division. Like both the Euclid
and glass plans, the Eaton plan offered to this bargaining unit provides individual
accounts from which money may be drawn during layoff or when seniority is-broken.
' Although the details of many contracts are still being negotiated, the following Ohio
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are payable if it has been established that supplementation is approved
by competent state authorities. Favorable rulings have been obtained in
a sufficient number of states, and payments from the Ford and General
Motors trust funds are likely to commence in June, 1956, in those states
permitting supplementation.7 If a state does not act to permit supple-
mentation by June 1, 1957, the contracts provide an alternative method
of payment in that state- substitute supplementary benefits. If this
alternative plan were to come into effect, a laid-off worker would apply
and receive UC for two weeks. In the third week, he would not file a
claim for UC but would receive three times the weekly supplemental
benefit to which he would be entitled if concurrent supplementation were
permitted.
The Ohio UC law provides for a waiting period of one week prior
to receiving benefits;8 therefore the first installment of substitute supple-
mentary benefits would actually be received in the fourth week of unem-
ployment. In the fifth and sixth weeks, the unemployed worker would
again draw benefits from the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation
(BUC), but nothing from the trust fund. In the seventh week, he would
again receive three times his weekly credit from the trust fund but no
state benefits. During an extended period of unemployment, this stag-
gering of private and public payments could continue for a total of 35
weeks for an individual eligible for the maximum duration of both UC
and SUB benefits.
A claimant may elect to collect UC for three weeks and receive four
times the supplemental benefit; hence benefits would be paid for a total
of 33 weeks if the individual were eligible for maximum benefits and re-
mained unemployed. Obviously, the total amount of benefits paid to an
individual under the three-week or four-week staggered procedure, or if
SUB were paid simultaneously, would not always be the same. The
amount received would depend upon the option chosen and the duration
of the spell of unemployment. The following table contrasts the posi-
tion of various types of claimants at the end of seven weeks of unem-
ployment.
firms have announced the earliest dates on which their employees will become eligi-
ble for supplementary benefits: American Can Co., October, 1956; DeVilbiss Co.,
October 1, 1957; Libbey-Owens-Ford and Pittsburgh Plate Glass, September 25,
1956; International Harvester Co., September 1, 1956; Ohio Crankshaft Co., July 1,
1956; Randall Co., October 1, 1957; Trailmobile, Inc., August 1, 1956; White Motor
Co., June 15, 1956.
7UNIED AUTOMOBILE WORKER, March 1956, p. 2.
8 Omo REy. CODE 5 4141.29 (B).
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TABLE - UC AND SUB BENEFrrs UNDER ALTERNATIVE
METHODS OF PAYMENT (In Dollars)
Week Two-week Three-week Simul- Ordinary
staggered SUB staggered SUB taneous SUB Claimant
UC SUB UC SUB UC SUB UC
Waiting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 33 0 33 0 33 25 33
3 33 0 33 0 33 25 33
4 0 75 33 0 33 25 33
5 33 0 0 100 33 25 33
6 33 0 33 0 33 25 33
7 0 75 33 0 33 25 33
Total after
7 weeks 132 150 165 100 198 150 198
Coverage and Potential Coverage in Ohio
It is of course difficult to estimate how many workers are covered by
SUB contracts in Ohio. As of March 1, 1956, at least forty Ohio firms
had signed SUB contracts covering an estimated 175,000 workers. In
addition, some expansion of coverage can be expected. Collective bar-
gaining settlements are usually influenced by a few key agreements.
Private pension programs spread very rapidly once the principle was ac-
cepted in the steel industry during the winter of 1949-50. There is a
similarity between SUB and private pension plans, and some unions have
been preparing SUB programs for coming negotiations. Particularly
significant will be the negotiations in the steel industry this year.
The additional "SUB bargaining pattern" in Ohio includes about
475,000 workers, distributed roughly as follows: transportation equip-
ment, 30,000; rubber products, 65,000; primary metal industries, 140,-
000; electrical machinery and supplies, 60,000; fabricated metal products,
45,000; machinery (except electrical), 95,000; and miscellaneous, 40,000.
This potential "SUB bargaining pattern" excludes the firms which have
already granted such contracts; the soft-goods lines, e.g. textiles and
clothes; relatively unorganized industries such as the service trades, retail
trade and finance; and the coal and railroad industries, the utilities, and
the chemical industry, where little interest is manifested in these pro-
grams.
The total number of workers in Ohio that may be covered by SUB
is therefore approximately 650,000 or approximately one-fourth of those
now covered by UC. Of course, not all of these employees would have
the necessary seniority to be covered by the SUB contracts now in ex-
istence or those likely to be signed.
'The Steelworkers' interest is evident in their own publication, STEEL LABOR, April
1956, pp. 2-3. See also, BusiNEss WEEK, March 10, 1956, pp. 145-6; March 17,
1956, pp. 176-7.
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Supplementation, Costs, and Unemployment Compensation Machinery
Unemployment compensation in Ohio is entirely employer-financed.
Contribution (tax) rates are levied against the first $3,000 of each
covered worker's wages, and revised annually by the BUC.j0 Each em-
ployer's contribution rate is computed by means of a formula with the
following components: (1) the balance in the UC Reserve Fund divided
by the average of all covered payrolls for the preceding three years - this
component is commonly referred to as the "state-wide factor," and (2)
the individual employer's contributions (plus interest earnings) minus
benefit charges for the past period divided by the individual employer's
average covered payroll, for the three years ending on June 30.
A separate account is maintained by the BUC with each employer.
Benefits paid to an individual are charged against the accounts of firms
which employed the individual during his base period of one year. Such
benefits are charged in the inverse chronological order in which the em-
ployment of such individual occurred. The maximum amount of bene-
fits which may be charged against an employer's account may not exceed
one-half of the wages paid by the employer to the claimant."
The amount of weekly benefits which a daimant receives is based
upon the highest quarterly wages received by him during his base period.
An individual's base period is the four calendar quarters immediately
preceding the first day of his benefit year. A benefit year is the year be-
ginning with the week in which an individual first files a valid applica-
tion for determination of his benefit rights. The formula by which bene-
fits are computed permits workers who earned $4.62 weekly in the high-
est quarter of their base year to receive weekly benefits of $10, which
is 216.5 per cent of average weekly wages during the high quarter. As
high-quarter wages rise, this percentage declines- for instance, workers
who earned $63.15 weekly during their high quarter receive $33 in bene-
fits, or 50.7 per cent of average weekly wages. Individuals with depen-
dent children are allowed additional benefits of $3 for each child up to a
maximum of two. In April, 1955, 75 per cent of all benefit recipients
were receiving the (then) maximum benefit of $30 (exclusive of de-
pendents' benefits).
The first requirement for eligibility is registration each week at an
employment office. An individual must be able to work, available for
suitable work, and actively seeking such work either in a locality in which
"
0Whether contributions to SUB funds will be taxed has not been resolved. The
BUC has the authority to decide the issue. The Attorney-General of West Virginia
has ruled that payments into funds established by the glass industry are taxable as
wages under the UC law. U.S. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (BNA) 37 LAB.
REL. REP. 309. Text of ruling at 329.
1 OHIO REV. CODE 5 4141.24.
(September
SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
he has earned base period wages or in a locality where such work is
normally performed. The individual must be unable to obtain suitable
work. He must have been employed by a subject employer in at least
20 weeks within his base period, and he must have served a waiting
period of one week before becoming eligible for benefits. Finally, he
must not have been disqualified from receiving benefits.'
2
Many non-SUB employers believe that SUB payments might in some
way affect the UC Reserve Fund, and hence all contributors through the
"statewide factor." It is dearly a difficult task to foresee all of the ef-
fects of SUB upon the Reserve Fund. It can safely be said, however,
that it is doubtful whether the Fund will be significantly affected.' 3
Ohio's industrial position with respect to some of the states bordering
it may create a special problem. The number of interstate claims paid
by the Ohio UC Reserve Fund is more than three times the number paid
by other states to Ohio residents and approximately nine per cent of the
total claims against the Ohio Fund. If SUB claimants were to receive
benefits by mail from a private trust fund, they could also receive UC
benefits accrued in Ohio by registering with the employment security
agencies in other states.14 SUB claimants would thus be assured of at
least sixty percent of Ohio earnings for periods up to 26 weeks.
Although this level of income undoubtedly presents a substantial in-
centive to seek employment in the high-wage Ohio economy, sixty per-
cent of the claimants' former earnings in Ohio would be close to the
level of local wages in many non-industrial areas in other states. How-
ever, the importance of this disparity can be over-emphasized. The ma-
jority of unemployed workers who leave the area in which they were
last employed probably have little seniority. As a result, their SUB pay-
ments would probably be of short duration-at least for the first few
Disqualification may occur because of (1) refusal of suitable employment, with
certain exceptions -commonly referred to as the "job test," (2) not actively seek-
ing work, (3) discharged for just cause, (4) voluntary quit, (5) unemployed
as a result of a labor dispute, (6) receipt of certain types of remuneration enumer-
ated in the law, (7) obtaining benefits by fraud, (8) unemployment because of
commitment to a penal institution and (9) advocating or belonging to a party which
advocates overthrow of the government by force. OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.29.
' There is a staggering volume of literature on this subject. For a selected list of
books, periodical articles and government documents relating to the economic effects
of guaranteed wage or employment plans, see U.S. BUREAU Op LABOR STATISTICs,
DEP'T oF LABOR, BIBLIoGRAPHY LS 55-3408 (June 1955).
"Many of the contracts provide that a claimant shall report both to the state agency
and to an office designated by the company. However, the American Motors Com-
pany appears to be developing a "one-stop" plan in which the claimant will report
only to the state agency. See 37 LAB. REL. REP. 429.
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years of the plan.15 Moreover, skilled workers would in many cases be
disqualified from drawing benefits in a non-industrial area.
Contracts negotiated in the future may place upon the employer lia-
bility for part of all of the state unemployment compensation benefits of
employees who are not eligible or who are disqualified. 16 These provi-
sions, if negotiated, will create a real problem for the firm- whether to
meet the added cost out of the SUB fund or to contest the BUC's denial
of benefits and attempt to obtain a reversal of the decision. A firm en-
joying the minimum tax rate might prefer to pay idle employees out of
its own fund, rather than risk an increase in its tax rate. On the other
hand, it has been frequently suggested that a firm paying close to the
maximum rate may actually side with its employees in trying to obtain
benefits from the state.
Employer attitudes and activities are suggested by the widely differ-
ing disqualification rates among employment offices. In the first nine
months of 1952, for example, Dayton had 84.6 disqualifications per 1000
claimant-contacts; Cleveland had only 32.4; and Toledo, 23.6.17 The
variation could be accentuated if employers in some areas were to estab-
lish a privately administered eligibility board with power to grant or
deny SUB. Mr. William Papier of the Ohio BUC has observed, in this
connection:' 8
Will practices tend to vary, for example, between cities... ? If the
predominant employers in one city are... [plants with SUB contracts],
will local UC practices differ widely from those in another local area with
[non-SUB employers?] ...
Would practices vary within the same city, [between SUB-claimants
and non-SUB claimaints?] For example, all claimants have to be availa-
ble for other work. Would decisions relative to availability, suitable
work, and so on tend to be different? ... It could easily develop that legis-
lation, practice, or both would create dual patterns - ... [one for SUB
workers and one for non-SUB workers, one for SUB employers and one
for non-SUB employers.]
The possible consequences of SUB result more from contracts which
'5 Accrual of "credit units" (entitlement to SUB) is slower for workers with less than
ten years' seniority under the Ford and General Motors contracts. Credit units may
also be cancelled depending on the amount of the fund and worker seniority.
"'This would not be the same as paying SUB to employees who have exhausted their
benefit rights under the state system, as provided in the Allis-Chalmers and can
company contracts.
DIvisioN OF REsEARrCH AND STAnsTIcs, OHIO BUREAU OF UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION, Analysis 347, October 28, 1952. These rates are of course affected
by the other factors, such as the size of the community and degree of industrialization,
which could determine the availability of alternative jobs and the composition of the
labor force.
" William Papier, Guaranteed Annual Wage Proposals: Their Implications for Un-
employment Compensation, 8 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 265, 273 (1955).
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could be negotiated in the future than from those currently in effect.
Unions will undoubtedly press for more liberal eligibility standards than
provided in the law. Administrative safeguards in applying eligibility
tests may be sufficient to prevent any noticeable increase in abuses of
unemployment compensation. However, the requisite cross-checking be-
tween the private administrators and the BUC will make for a more
cumbersome system and higher costs.
An Adminsitrative Ruling
Payments under some of the contracts would not require the approval
of the Administrator of the BUC. Others, particularly the Ford and Gen-
eral Motors contracts, require BUC approval of concurrent supplementary
payments. If the BUC were to rule against concurrent benefits, a separate
ruling on-substitute supplementary benefits probably would be necessary.19
Research into applicable law reveals few and conflicting precedents
on which the Administrator might base a ruling.20 However, the many
favorable rulings by the Attorneys-General of other states may serve as
some precedent in Ohio. Undoubtedly, the framers of the law never con-
templated supplementation. The decision -whether to permit or re-
ject concurrent supplementation -may be appealed to the courts. A
ruling against supplementation can easily be appealed by a worker, but
opponents of a favorable ruling may find it difficult to discover grounds
for an appeal.
A worker denied UC might go to court on the ground that his pay-
ment cannot be considered remuneration from his employer.21  This ap-
peal would be based on the fact that SUB was paid from a fund to which
both employer and employee had renounced any claim. The worker could
also appeal, relying on the code which permits2 2 "... . employees individ-
ually or collectively to agree to make contributions for the purpose of se-
The Ohio BUC Administration ruled in mid-May against concurrent supplementa-
tion. The text of the opinion is available at CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. (Ohio) 5
8529. The Indiana Attorney-General has also ruled against supplementation. Id.
(Ind.) 5 8223.
'Effect of Receiving Supplemental Unemployment Benefits on Eligibility for State
Benefits, 69 HARv. L Rnv. 362 (1955); U.S. BUREAU OF NATiONAL AFFAiRs
(BNA), Guaranteed Annual Wage, Washington, 1955, pp. 92-96.
The following argument assumes that the Administrator had reduced the claim-.
ants benefits by the amount of the SUB payment, less $2, under OHIO REV. CODE S
4141.30 (C): "Benefits are payable to each partially unemployed individual other-
wise eligible on account of each week of involuntary partial unemployment after the
specified waiting period in an amount equal to his weekly benefit amount less that
part of the remuneration payable to him with respect to such week which is in ex-
cess of two dollars increased to the next higher even multiple of one dollar."
21 OHto Rnv. CODE § 4141.36.
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curing benefits in addition to those provided by Sections .4141.01 to
4141A6, inclusive, of the Revised Code." This provision, coupled with
a BUC ruling that permits veterans to. claim unemployment benefits
(UCV) from the federal government23 ,.and full state benefits, has es-
tablished the precedent that a claimant can receive two distinct payments
for involuntary unemployment in the same week. The aggrieved worker
would then ask: "If the federal government can supplement state unem-
ployment compensation checks on the basis of prior military service, and
if employees can do so on their initiative, why cannot their employer do
the same by establishing an autonomous trust fund?"
Any employer affected 'by a favorable decision could bring a taxpay-
er's suit against the Administrator. However, an employer who has
negotiated an SUB program is not likely to challenge a ruling that allows
him to put his program into effect. Any other employer would not be
notified regarding charges against his account for UC benefits until such
charges have been made. Because at least one year of seniority is re-
quird for participation in all of the private SUB programs negotiated to
date, benefits would not be charged to the account of a non-SUB em-
ployer in connection with a UC claim involving SUB except under rather
unusual circumstances.24
Even after establishing a financial interest through a charge-back of
benefits to his account, the non-SUB employer would have legal difficul-
ties. In WillysOverland v. Jones,2 5 the Ohio Supreme Court denied a
petition to prohibit the BUC from paying a new schedule of benefits
authorized by the General Assembly, to an individual who had been un-
employed before the effective date of the law. Although the petitioner's
account would be affected, the court held that he had an adequate remedy
under the existing appeals sections of the law.26
In Geyer v. Collopy,27 a petition for a writ of prohibition was denied
because the petitioner could not show that his contribution rate was af-
fected by the Administrator's decision. The court declared:
It would appear that the interest of the relator is solely in the possible
increase of contribution rates to the general state fund. His merit rating
cannot be affected because he has no employee-claimants whose unem-
ployment compensation payments may be affected or changed by the legis-
'The ruling on UCV has not been tested in the courts.
" Seniority provisions in some union contracts, for example, UAW and the Ford
Motor Co., do permit breaks in service for certain reasons, but it might take a con-
siderable period of time for a case to arise from which a valid appeal could be made
through the channels prescribed by law.
' 146 Ohio St. 388, 66 N.E.2d 115 (1946).
2OHIo REv. CoDE §§ 4141.26 and 4141.28.
" 152 Ohio St. 485, 90 N.E.2d 370 (1950).
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lative amendment. In the opinion of this court the statute has made ample
provisions for hearings before the administrative branches of the bureau
in fixing contribution rates and ample provisions for appeals therefrom.
Considering all of the allegations of the petition, this court is of the opin-
ion that the relator has an adequate remedy at law, as a result of which the
remedy of probition will not lie.'
Although there was a vigorous dissent in the latter case,29 the inference
which may be drawn from these decisions is that the court will not pro-
hibit the payment of full state benefits to an SUB claimant if the BUC
permits them. At a later date an employer may appeal an actual in-
crease in rates established by the BUC. At any time in which the "state-
wide factor" Were to affect contribution rates, it would seem that any
covered employer in Ohio could appeal against his new rate determina-
tion. He would allege that depletion of the state fund due to failure to
deduct SUB from benefits had affected his contribution rate. As the ex-
tra amount was paid to numerous claimants because of obligations in-
curred by other employers, he would allege that he has no adequate
remedy under existing law and must therefore appeal directly to the
courts.
The Administrator's defense would probably be to question whether
SUB was the determining factor in depleting the fund sufficiently to
bring the "statewide factor" into play. The fund is affected by numerous
factors, including the volume of covered employment and the size and
duration of compensable claims. It would be a formidable statistical task
to prove that any general rate change was attributable to SUB.
Under an unusual set of circumstances, a non-SUB employer might
be able to demonstrate an increased charge because of SUB. The cir-
cumstances are: (1) A former employee has "sandwiched" employment
with a non-SUB firm between periods of employment with an SUB em-
ployer; (2) this employee had filed a valid claim against the SUB em-
ployer; (3) the employment record with this firm fell in the claimant's
base period; (4) a valid continued claim was filed each week by the
claimant until he had been paid the total amount of benefits chargeable
to the SUB firm; (5) benefits paid to this employee were then charged
back to the non-SUB employer; (6) if the SUB had been deducted, the
amount charged against the second firm's account would be less than the
maximum amount 0 0 A protest could then -be filed with the BUC.
The protesting employer would complain that because SUB had not
'Id. at 489, 90 N.E.2d at 373.
11d. at 490, 90 N.E.2d at 373.
' Otherwise, a larger sum would not be charged against the non-SUB firm's account
because of the Administrator's decision to permit concurrent supplementation, since
the maximum charge is one-half of the wages paid by the employer to the claimant.
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been deducted from benefits while they were being charged against the
account of the SUB employer, an illegal charge was later made against
his (the non-SUB employer's) account.31 In replying to this protest,
the Administrator might set forth the reasons why he believed SUB not
to be remuneration, hence not deductible. This determination by the Ad-
ministrator that SUB was not remuneration could be appealed to a court
of common pleas.
The likelihood of a case developing under these limitations is ques-
tionable. In addition, the non-SUB employer would probably not be
aware of the other base-period employer whose account had previously
been charged. Many years might elapse before employers would uncover
a case which might be appealed.
Legislative Action
An administrative ruling will undoubtedly be made. Nevertheless,
the General Assembly may prefer to act, when it convenes in January,
1957, for a variety of reasons. An administrative ruling will not be bind-
ing on the courts. In addition, there have been widely publicized re-
ports that SUB will be blocked by litigation. Obviously, some expres-
sion of legislative intent is desirable to remove the uncertainty over the
status of SUB.
The alternatives facing the General Assembly are perhaps five in
number: (1) To do nothing -thus permitting either concurrent or
substitute benefits, depending on administrative rulings and possible ap-
peals to the courts; (2) to prevent any supplementation of unemploy-
ment compensation; (3) to permit all claimants to receive a certain
percent of average high-quarter weekly earnings, in the form of SUB
and unemployment compensation; (4) to authorize the BUC to pay
supplements and bill the employer; (5) to exempt SUB payments from
the definition of remuneration.
The consequences of a ruling by the Administrator in favor of con-
current supplementation have been discussed. If the General Assembly
takes no action, and the Administrator rules against concurrent supple-
mentation, substitute supplementary benefits may be paid in Ohio be-
ginning June 1, 1957. Only an administrative ruling prohibiting these
payments or an adverse court decision in Ohio, or the reversal of legal
opinions already rendered in other states,32 could then upset the payment
' The appeal to the Administrator and the courts could be made (1) at the time of
the charge-back and (2) at the time of a new rate determination -assuming that
the extra charge had affected the non-SUB employer's contribution rate.
'aThe Ford and General Motors contracts state: ". . . or if any such ruling... shall
be repealed or revoked after June 1, 1957, with the effect that the rulings and
amendments that continue in effect are in states in which (in the aggregate) less than
[September
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of these benefits in Ohio. Legislative inactivity could therefore result
in either concurrent supplementation, or the adoption of the substitute
plan, for an indefinite period, or the prevention of both.
In adopting the first alternative, the General Assembly would be re-
fusing to take a position on an important policy matter and permitting
the courts to rule on the basis of a statute written without any thought
given to the issue. In addition, the controversy could continue in the
courts for many years without any final decision on the numerous com-
plexities presented. This alternative would appear to have little attrac-
tion for either the proponents or opponents of supplementation.
To specifically prevent any payment of supplemental benefits, the
General Assembly would have to amend the code. First, it would have to
require that SUB be deducted from UC benefits. 'This amendment may
not specifically prevent the payment of substitute unemployment bene-
fits. To block these payments, additional language providing for the
allocation of the lump-sum payment to each week of unemployment
would be necessary. These amendments would probably stop any pay-
ments to Ohio employees of several million dollars which have been ac-
cruing in various SUB funds.3 3
The proposal to permit supplementation but to limit the percentage
of combined UC and SUB payments is the third alternative.34 The justi-
fication for limiting the combined benefits is based largely on the ground
that the state has a direct interest in the payments which an unemployed
worker receives 3 5 As the percentage approaches the worker's regular
take-home pay, it is argued that the incentive to seek new employment
diminishes. To accomplish the third alternative, the following provision
two-thirds (2/3) of the employees .... all obligations of the Company under the
Plan shall cease and the Plan thereupon shall terminate .... See Ford agreement.
Article IX, Sec. 5C, General Motors agreement, Article IX, Sec. 5C.
'Virginia has enacted legislation to prohibit the payment of SUB. 37 LAB. REL.
REP. 328, 429. For specific language, see CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. (Va.) 5 4026,
" Legislation to limit the percentage of the total combined payment from private and
state benefits was introduced in New York and Michigan. The bills also sought to
limit SUB payments to $25 per week. In New York, the bill did not pass; the out-
come in Michigan was uncertain at the time this article was completed. 37 LAB. REL.
R.EP. 353, 453.
'A variant of this proposal has been suggested in Ohio which would permit all
claimants to receive a certain percentage of average weekly wages in the form of SUB,
part-time earnings, unemployment compensation or any combination of the three.
This has generally been advanced in the interest of fairness to individuals not covered
by SUB who might take part-time jobs while drawing UC benefits. These workers
could not earn more than $2 per week under the present law without losing benefits
equal in amount to part-time earnings. At the same time, workers drawing SUB
may be able to receive up to - percent of take-home wages in UC and SUB. This
proposal has received practically no consideration.
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might be added to Ohio Revised Code section 4141.30, which deals with
benefit payments:
(F) Payments under a supplemental unemployment benefit program
financed in whole or in part by an employer and any benefits paid to an
unemployed individual according to division B of Section 4141.30 of the
Revised Code may not exceed ... percent of his average weekly wage as
computed by dividing the wages earned in the highest quarter of his base
period by thirteen. If the combined payment does exceed ---- percent
of the average weekly wage, payment to the unemployed individual under
division B of Section 4141.30 of the Revised Code shall be reduced by
that amount which exceeds ---- percent.
Such a limitation obviously circumscribes the type of contracts which
may be negotiated in the future. SUB is a fringe benefit, negotiated and
agreed to in free collective bargaining. It allows employers to experi-
ment with a higher level of benefits without committing the state to that
level. To place rigid limits on a new and developing social experiment
at its inception may be unwise. If the trend toward supplementation of
unemployment benefits continues, employers and unions may immediately
begin to seek ways to circumvent the limitation, e.g., the savings-type
SUB plan and other types of tandem arrangements.
A fourth legislative alternative was suggested by Paul A. Raushen-
bush, Director of the Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Depart-
ment. 6 This proposal would enact legislation which would authorize
employers to request the BUC to pay additional benefits. These benefits
would be financed by means of higher contributions to the electing em-
ployer's account with the BUC. One benefit check would be made out
by the BUC to cover both regular and supplemental benefits. This ar-
rangement would enable the state to retain considerable control over the
content of the SUB programs. In addition, high-seniority workers would
have greater assurances of the solvency of the reserve fund. From the
employer's point of view, the reserves required to finance the program
might be less than for a separate SUB fund. As a result, more funds
would be available for business expansion and investment.
Only those employers whose past experience record indicates that
they are in a position to pay the additional cost through special contri-
butions would be eligible. On the other hand, a qualifying employer
should not be required to pay in advance the total cost of his election.
The electing employer should instead be required to pay some extra con-
tribution rate at the time of, and for a period immediately following, his
1 U.S. BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAms (BNA), Guaranteed Annual Wage, Wash-
ington, 1955, pp. 97-98. Legislation similar to the Raushenbush proposal was in-
troduced in the Rhode Island legislature. See BNA, 37 LAB. REL. REP. 329; BuSI-
NESS WEEK, Feb. 4, 1956, p. 104.
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election. Since the election options would vary in cost, they could easily
carry varying price tags.
The options available to qualified employers could deal with both
parts of the benefits formula: (a) we'ekly benefits amounts and' (b)
weeks of duration. As to weekly benefits amounts, options might simply
permit increases by a specified number of dollars or- by a specified per-
centage. As to weeks of duration, several -alternatives could also be speci-
fied, varying in liberality and in cost. Claimants might be permitted to
draw'benefits for an additional number of weeks. Alternatively, eligi-
bility for additional weeks' benefits might be geared to seniority. While
the possibilities are numerous, a few well-defined options should be
dearly specified in the law.
A reserve ratio of 8 per cent may be specified as qualifying an em-
ployer to select an. option. Based on 1954 ratios, 47.2 per cent .of
employers, with 59.3 per cent of taxable payroll, would thus be qualified.
An electing employer would pay an additional contribution of 1.0 per-
cent of average annual payroll for five quarters before special benefits
became payable and for seven quarters afterwards. 37 Payment of any
special benefits would obviously increase the charges against the em-
ployers account and. be reflected in the rate determination for the next
year.
If an electing employer's reserve ratio should drop to zero, the special
benefit plan for this employer would be terminated. Unless the plan is
terminated at this point, the employer's special benefits program could
be subsidized from the reserve fund.
An additional feature of this alternative would be a system of special
penalty rates to protect high seniority workers. If the electing employer's
reserve funds were not supplemented in a period of extraordinarily heavy
drain, the special benefits could be cancelled in some cases because of
the depletion of reserve funds to pay benefits to low-seniority employees.
These special penalty rates would' also provide added -protection for the
UC reserve fund.
A simple exemption of, SUB payments from the definition of re-
muneration is the fifth legislative alternative3 8 This could be achieved
by adding the following language to Ohio Revised Code section 4141.01
(H) (2), which defines remuneration:
'An alternative to increasing the contribution rate would be to raise the base above
$3000 of earnings per worker. The proposal in Rhode Island would impose a 1 per
cent tax on both employers and employees.
'Georgia and Maryland have enacted legislation approving SUB payments, CCH
UNEmp. INs. REP. (Ga.) 5 4072, (Md.) 5 4077.
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The amount of any payment to an individual under a plan established
by an employer which supplements unemployment compensation benefits
of his employees under the terms of a written agreement, contract, trust
arrangement, or other instrument.
Few new administrative responsibilities need be placed on the BUC.39
Employees and unions would be given wide discretion to experiment and
develop SUB programs. The specific exemption of SUB income would
relieve the BUC of the necessity of investigating the amount and method
of payment of SUB, once it had been established that a claimant was a
beneficiary of such a plan. It would also prevent SUB from creating eli-
gibility for future UC benefits.
Conclusions
An administrative ruling on so novel and controversial an issue as
supplementation of unemployment compensation may not be considered
a final and binding expression of public policy in Ohio. A statement of
legislative intent would dearly be effective in forestalling extensive liti-
gation and uncertainty. On the other hand, legislative concern with the
details of SUB programs will unduly involve the General Assembly in
the collective bargaining process. The adoption of each new type of
contract would be the occasion for extensive lobbying for amendments to
the law to permit the innovation.
To reject supplementation completely could result in the loss of con-
siderable purchasing power during a recession. Some form of supplementa-
tion should be permitted because of this potential economic loss to the
state. The Raushenbush proposal undoubtedly has merit, but the ex-
istence of private trust funds established by a large number of firms
makes it rather unlikely that the proposal will receive serious legislative
consideration. In addition, the intermingling of private supplements
with the reserve fund would invite further intervention by employers in
the details of administration.
The choice seems to lie between a limitation on SUB-UC or exemp-
tion of SUB from the definition of remuneration (alternatives 3 and 5).
' That all of the problems of the BUC would not be automatically solved is evident
in the remarks of Mr. Papier before the Society for Advancement of Management,
Columbus, Ohio, January 27, 1956: "There are certain provisions in the contracts
... under which private payments may be made even though state payments cannot.
The duration of private payments, for example, may be longer than for state bene-
fits. It would seem, therefore, that whenever an unemployed worker exhausts his
state benefit rights, the private fund administrators would want to know. Or if he
received benefits from us in error or fraudulently, we would expect to recover, and
perhaps prosecute. But state benefits wrongly paid could also mean private supple-
ments wrongly paid. How would the private trustees know of such cases, except
from us?"
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A limitation might provide protection against possible abuse of UC by
claimants. However, there is'little factual basis for preferring any specific
percentage as a maximum. If enacted, the limitation would quickly
become a target for upward adjustment by interest groups and would
unduly involve the General Assembly in collective bargaining negotia-
tions. To exempt SUB earnings from the definition of remuneration per-
mits private experimentation with higher benefit levels, without com-
mitting the state system to these levels. If the level of benefits should
appear to threaten the fund, remedial action by the General Assembly
could doubtless be taken before any significant depletion occurs.
Some thought should be given to the possible impact of privately
determined eligibility standards on the UC Reserve Fund. If employers
should agree to make up any loss in UC benefits due to ineligibility or
disqualification of claimants, there may be some adverse impact on the
fund. If such contracts are negotiated, it may be wise to take the pre-
caution of removing the maximum contribution rate for all rated accounts
with firms having such contracts.
